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IT Investment Strategy of B2B E-Commerce Website with Sequential Entry
Li Li Zhaoxia Xie
School of Economics & Management, Nanjing University of Science & Technology, China
Abstract: In the competitive market of B2B e-commerce website, as customer switching cost and network externality could
prevent customers to switch to later entrant, the earlier entrant has the advantage to build and retain its market share.
However, the declining cost of information technology (IT) over time provides the later entrant a cost advantage. In order to
maintain competitive advantage, what should the earlier and later entrant’s investment strategies be in the presence of
customer switching costs, network externalities, and declining IT cost? To analyze this question, considering these three
factors, the paper develops IT investment strategy model of a duopoly with sequential entry and discusses the impact of these
three factors on IT investment strategy. The results show that, with the declining IT cost, the early entrant may increase its
investment in quality, assume an aggressive investment strategy when switching cost is high, otherwise, the later entrant may
increase its investment in quality, assume an aggressive investment strategy, and could offer a higher-quality system and
capture a higher market share when switching cost is low. With the increase in network externality intensity, the early entrant
may increase its investment in quality, assume an aggressive investment strategy, and the later entrant may decrease its
investment in quality, assume a defensive investment strategy.

Keywords: IT investment strategy, declining IT cost, switching cost, network externality, B2B e-commerce website

1. INTRODUCTION
B2B e-commerce website is an online platform, providing services for transactions between corporate
customers. Corporate customers of website are divided into sellers and buyers. B2B e-commerce website
provides information release service for sellers, and information search, browsing, recommendation service for
buyers. These services’ realization mainly relies on IT investment [1]. IT investment is directly related to service
quality. Service quality would affect customer’s choice, furthermore, affect website’s market share. Thus, IT
investment plays an important role in market share for B2B e-commerce website.
China Electronic Commerce Research Center reports that, in China, number of B2B e-commerce websites
reaches 9200 in late 2010, an increase of more than 21.3% year on year.B2B market is in a high-speed
development stage. With the emergence of new entrants in B2B market, earlier entrant has own a certain market
share, and since customers’ choice is commonly affected by switching cost and network externality, earlier
entrant has market share advantage through IT investment. Switching cost refers to the effort and expense
involved in switching from one provider to another

[2]

. Switching cost discourages customers from moving to a

competitor’s website. Network externality means ‘the extent to which the demand for a website is increased due
to the fact that others are also choosing the same website’. Network externality makes customers prefer to
choose earlier entrant that has a certain market share

[3]

. Switching cost and network externality help earlier

entrant retain their customers.
Generally, in the B2B market with distinguishing characteristic of switching cost and network externality,
earlier entrant easily comes into being ‘winner takes all’. In practice, the phenomenon that later entrant exceeds
earlier entrant is also observed. For example, china.toocle.com was founded in 2007, website has introduced
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e-commerce vertical search, providing cross-platform search service for users, and introduced business
relationship circle based on Social Networking Service (SNS), providing recommended services for users,
successively. Taking advantage of high service quality, tootle quickly attracts a large number of users, be ranked
fourth in B2B market with market share of 2.9%, exceeding many earlier entrants. Therefore, IT investment
could create competitive advantage for later entrant. In fact, this advantage results from IT progress and
declining IT cost. Empirical studies support this assertion

[4]

. Reference [5] showed that earlier entrant has lower

market share when later entrant utilizes an advanced technology with lower costs and higher quality. Declining
IT cost offers later entrant a potential advantage. In B2B market, the earlier entrant’s advantage is attributed to
the existence of switching cost and network externality, whereas the later entrant’s advantage is due to
technological progress that results in lower prices and better technologies for later entrant. What should the
earlier and later entrant's investment strategies be in the presence of switching cost, network externality, and
declining IT cost? Should earlier entrant competes with later entrant aggressively, by investing more, or
defensively, by investment less?
In the research on declining IT cost, Reference [6] analyzed product positioning strategy of a duopoly with
sequential entry, the results showed that when earlier entrant is difficult to determine cost structure of later
entrant, the cost uncertainty would affect product positioning of earlier entrant. Reference [7] studied IT
investment strategy of a duopoly with sequential entry when IT cost declines, and reported that later entrant
would exceed earlier entrant because of lower cost and higher-quality technology. Thus, declining IT cost has
the opposite effect on the strategy choice of earlier entrant and later entrant. In the research on switching cost
and network externality, many studies focused on the effect of switching cost and network externality on pricing
strategy, and explored how to expand market share through price strategy [8][9]. But the empirical research found
that, except price, website quality also has an important effect on customer’s choice and use. The existing
literatures is lack of analyzing the effect of IT investment on improving service quality and further expanding
market share, in the perspective of switching cost and network externality. In summary, the existing literatures
discuss the strategy problem when declining IT cost, switching cost and network externality affect respectively,
less consider the investment strategy integrated with the interactive effect of these factors.
To analyze these questions, the paper develops IT investment strategy model of a duopoly with sequential
entry, which incorporates sources of earlier entrant’s advantage and later entrant’s advantage. Furthermore,
discusses the impact of switching cost, network externality, and declining IT cost on IT investment strategy.
2. MODEL SETUP
We consider two B2B e-commerce websites, labeled as website 1 and website 2. Website 1 prior to website 2
enters the market. When there are many websites in the market, users make their choice based on service quality,
and all customers prefer higher to lower quality, although their valuations of quality may vary [10].
The specific assumptions of our model are as follows:
Website1, the pioneer, makes IT investments, which results in service quality level k1 , and offers the service
at price p0 .Website 2, the second mover, after observing k1 , makes IT investment, which results in service
quality level k2 . Website 1 and 2 simultaneously set their respective prices, p1 and p2 , after observing each
other’s service quality. Customers who use website 1 initially and switch to website 2 after its entry incur a
one-time nonnegative switching cost, s .
The differentiation of service quality provided by website 1 and website 2 is represented as horizontally
differentiated line segment [0,1] . We assume that website 1 is located at zero, and website 2 is located at one.
Customers are distributed uniformly on the line [0,1] , the perceived quality dimension of customer is modeled
using parameter x , x  [0,1] . Customers incur a utility loss of t per unit distance between their ideal preference
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and actual quality. Thus, customer at x receives a disutility of tx from choosing website 1’s service and a
disutility of t 1  x  from choosing website 2’s service [10].
Customers are heterogeneous in their valuation of service quality. The value derived by a customer from
service quality is given by r   ki   ， i  1, 2 , where    0  is customer’s marginal utility for each
additional unit of service quality. r is customer’s utility for service quality which only meets customer’s basic
need, and  is a random variable with zero mean and support   ,   .
Investment in service quality improvement program increases fixed costs. The fixed costs are increasing and
convex in service quality. In this regard, IT investments C1 , C2 , of website1 and 2 are given by

C1  k12 2 , C2    k22 2  , where   0    1 models the declining IT cost.

Network externality utility is defined as a function of network size and network externality intensity. Every
customer derives utility from the network size of the website he has chosen. Since these sizes are actually
determined after customers make their choices. Customers choose a website based on their expectations about
each website’s network. Thus, customer derives network externality utility from website 1 with  q1e , from
website 2 with  q2e ,where   0    1 measures network externality intensity of B2B market, q1e is the
number of customers expected to choose website 1’s service, and q2e is the number of customers expected to
choose website 2’s service.
Based on above assumptions, after website 1 and 2’s entry, for a customer located at x , the utility from
choosing website 1 is

U1  r   k1     q1e  p1  tx .
The utility from choosing website 2 is

U 2  r   k2     q2e  p2  t 1  x   s .
The customer, who is indifferent between choosing from website 1 and switching to website 2 after website
2 enters the market, is located at

x

  k1  k2     q1e  q2e    p2  p1   t  s
2t

According to rational expectations hypothesis, there exists q1  q1e  x and q2  q2e  1  x . Thus, market share
of website 1 and 2 can be computed as
1   k1  k2    p2  p1   s
q1  
2
2 t   

q2 

1   k1  k2    p2  p1   s

2
2 t   

For simplicity, we assume that the marginal costs as well as other fixed costs are zero. Therefore, the profit
for website 1 and 2,  1 ,  2 , can be written as

 1   k1  k2    p2  p1   s  k12

2 t   
 2
 2

1  p1q1  C1  p1  

 1   k1  k2    p2  p1   s   k22

2 t   
2
 2


 2  p2 q2  C2  p2  

3. PRICE AND QUALITY EQUILIBRIUM
We use the backward induction procedure to derive the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Consequently, we
start the last stage of the game, which is the price equilibrium after both websites have entered the market, then,
the first stage of the game, which is the quality equilibrium, that website 2 sets its service quality level after
observing website 1’s service quality.

60

The Eleventh Wuhan International Conference on E-Business——E-Business and Developments Track

3.1 Price equilibrium
Solving the first-order conditions for the equilibrium prices by maximizing the websites’ profit functions
simultaneously, that is, simultaneously solving 1 p1  0 ， 2 p2  0 , we obtain the following prices:
3  t       k1  k2   s
p1* 
(1)
3
3  t       k2  k1   s
p2* 
(2)
3
The price set by website is increasing in its own service quality, i.e., p1* k1  0 and p2* k2  0 ,and
decreasing in the competitor’s service quality, i.e., p1* k2  0 and p2* k1  0 . The price of website is
decreasing in network externality intensity, i.e., p1*   0 and p2*   0 . The price of website 1 (website
2) is increasing (decreasing) in the switching cost, i.e., p1* s  0 and p2* s  0 .
The market share for website 1 and 2 can be computed as
3  t       k1  k2   s
q1* 
6 t   
q2* 

3  t       k2  k1   s
6 t   

3.2 Quality equilibrium
In the stage preceding the pricing subgame, website 2 sets its service quality level after observing website
1’s service quality. Given price function and market share function, the profit for website 2 can be written as

3  t       k1  k2   s 
k2
2  
 2
18  t   
2
2

Website 2 maximizes 2  k1 , k2  over k2 .Consequently, k2 is found to be
k2  k1   arg max  2 

3  t      s   2 k1
9  t      2

(3)

The second-order condition for this maximization problem is given as    2 9  t    .Website 1 sets its
service quality level by anticipating website 2’s optimal quality given by (3). After substituting (3) in website 1’s
profit expression, we get website 1’s profit as

 t    9  t     2 2  3 s 
1 
2
2 9  t      2 

2



k12
2

The first-order condition for website 1’s maximization problem gives the following equilibrium service
quality level:
3  t    9  t     2 2  3 s 
*
k1 
(4)
2
9  t      2   9 2 2  t   
The second-order condition for website 1’s quality setting optimization problem is given
by    2 9  t     3 t    . This condition is more stringer than the second-order condition for website 2.


The condition provides a limit on the extent of decline in cost. We show later that if the condition is violated,
then website 1’s profit becomes negative, i.e., it will not enter the market, and website 2 will be a monopoly.
After substituting (4) into (3), we get the following equilibrium service quality level for website 2
9  t      2  3  t      s   6 3  t   
k2*  
2
9  t      2   9 2 2  t   
To

guarantee

nonnegative

prices

and

service

quality,

we

require

the

condition s  3  t     6  t    9  t       . For website 2 to invest and enter the market, the
2

2
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switching cost should satisfy the condition.
The profits of website 1 and 2 in the equilibrium are determined to be

 
*
1

 2* 

 t    9  t     2 2  3 s 



2



2 9  t      2   9 2 2  t   
2





 9  t      2  9  t      2  3  t     s   6 2  t   





2 9  t      2   9 2 2  t   
2

2

2

4 .THE IMPACT OF DECLINING IT COST
We analyze the impact of declining IT cost on websites’ investment strategies, measured by service quality
offered by them, and their profits.
4.1 The impact of declining IT cost on service quality
Our intuition suggests that declining IT costs will favor website 2 because it incurs a lower cost to achieve
the same service quality as website 1.However, the impact of declining IT cost on service quality depends on
switching cost. If switching cost is low, service quality has an important effect on customers’ choice. Customers
are prone to switch to other websites with higher service quality. If switching cost is high, customers have
stronger stickiness of the website，keeping good relationship with original website easily.
The analysis is complicated by the fact that the cutoff values that separate low and high switching cost
environments are different for each website. These cutoff values are derived through the first-order conditions of
the equilibrium points over  . Our first result summarizes the effect of declining IT cost on service quality
offered by website.
Proposition 1 For earlier entrant, website 1, there exists a switching cost s1 

2 9 1    t     2 
3 9  t     2 

,

if s  s1 , then k1*   0 ; if s  s1 , then k1*   0 .
Proposition 1 shows that, with the declining IT cost, if switching cost is low, such that s  s1 , website 1
assumes defensive investment strategy, decreasing investment on service quality in the initial stage of entry.
Thus, after website 2’s entry, since customers with low switching cost easily turn to website 2 with higher
service quality, defensive investment strategy could reduce website 1’ loss. If switching cost is high, such
that s  s1 , website1 assumes aggressive investment strategy, increasing investment on service quality. This
strategy could form higher switching cost, thus customers are less affected by service quality offered by website
2.
Proposition 2 For later entrant, website 2, there exists a switching cost

9  t    9  t      2    2  243 2  t     18 2 1    t     2 4 

,
s2 
2 2
2
2
3 9  t        3  9  t     2 
2

2

if s  s2 ,then k1*   0 ;if s  s2 , then k1*   0 .
Proposition 2 shows that, with the declining IT cost, if switching cost is low, such that s  s2 , website 2
assumes aggressive investment strategy, increasing investment on service quality. Thus, when website 2 offers
higher service quality at lower IT costs, the existence of low switching cost would make customer switch to
website 2. If switching cost is high, such that s  s2 , website 2 assumes defensive investment strategy,
decreasing investment on service quality. Customers with high switching cost have stronger stickiness of
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website 1. Therefore, it is difficult for website 2 to attract customers even if offering higher service quality.
4.2 The impact of declining IT cost on profit
In Proposition 1, we found that a moderate or high switching cost offsets the IT cost disadvantage to website
1 and allows it to compete aggressively with website 2 on service quality. We show in the next proposition that
website 1 is always hurt by declining IT cost. A surprising result is that website 2 may or may not benefit from
declining IT cost depending on switching cost. The effects of declining IT cost on profits are summarized in the
following result.
Proposition3

For earlier entrant, website 1, 1*   0 .

Proposition 3 shows that website 1’s profit decreases with declining IT cost. The primary effect of declining
IT cost is decreasing market share of website 1, because declining IT cost help website2 improve service quality
to attract customers. If switching cost is low, website 1 does not find increasing service quality to be attractive,
and then the lower market share causes a decline in its profit. However, as observed from Proposition 1, a
sufficiently high switching cost may still allow website 1 to increase service quality and offset the drop in
market share, but increased quality comes at increased cost. This increased cost to achieve the same level of
market share reduces the profit when IT cost declines. Consequently, website 1 can never be better off when IT
cost declines.
Proposition 4

For later entrant, website 2, there exists a switching cost
16 2  t    9  t      2 
2 2  t   
s3  3  t    

，if s  s3 , then  2*   0 ; if s  s3 ,
9  t      2 9  t      2  2  27 2 2  t   


*
then  2   0 .
Proposition 4 shows that, declining IT cost hurts website 2 if switching cost is sufficiently high. This finding
can be attributed to the strategic response of website 1 in response to declining IT cost. When switching cost is
high, website 1 finds it attractive to offset the potential decline in its market share from declining IT cost by
increasing its service quality. The increase in website 1’s service quality could be so high that website 2 could
find itself with a smaller market share than in the case when there is no decline in the IT cost. Website 2
attempts to restore its market share by increasing service quality in reaction to website 1’s aggressive response.
Consequently, website 2 ends up spending more for the same market share, even with the lower cost per unit
service quality.
5. THE IMPACT OF SWITCHING COST AND NETWORK EXTERNALITY
We analyze the impact of switching cost and network externality on service quality and profit.
5.1 The impact of switching cost on service quality and profit
The following results summarize the effects of switching cost on websites’ service quality and profits.
Proposition 5

For earlier entrant, website 1, k1* s  0 , 1* s  0 .For later entrant, website

2, k2* s  0 ,  2* s  0 .
Proposition 5 shows that, with an increase in switching cost, website 1 assume aggressive investment
strategy, and profit increases. Website 2 assumes defensive investment strategy, and profit decreases. Switching
cost helps website 1 rather than website 2 because customers that have already chosen website 1 will find it
more costly to choose website 2 later when there is switching cost, as opposed to when there is no switching
cost. Thus, the presence of a switching cost results in a higher market share for website 1. There is nothing to
offset the disadvantage to website 2 when switching cost increases. Consequently, website 1 increases service
quality, and website 2 decreases service quality in response to increase in the switching cost. The higher market
share for website 1 increases its profit, and the lower market share for website decreases its profit.
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Although the increase in switching cost helps website 1 rather than website 2, by comparing service quality
and market share, we find that, only if switching cost is higher than some cutoff values, website 1 is
service-quality leadership, market-share leadership.
Proposition 6

There exists a switching cost



18 2  t   
, if s  s4 , then k1*  k2* ; if s  s4 , then k1*  k2* .
s4  3  t    1  2
2 
9

t



9

t










There exists a switching cost s1 

2 9 1    t     2 
3 9  t     2 

, if s  s1 , then q1*  q2* ; if s  s1 , then q1*  q2* .

5.2 The effect of network externality on service quality and profit
Generally, network externality increases entry barriers of later entrant. We illustrate the impact of network
externality using numerical examples. By setting t  1 ,   1 ,   1 ,   1 , s  0 ,table 1 presents market share,
service quality, IT investment, price and profit of website 1 and 2 with the change of network externality intensity,
such that   0.1,0.5 .
Table 1 Market share, service quality, price and profit when  0.1,0.5


q1

q2

k1

k2

0.1

0.512

0.488

0.389

0.326

0.921

0.2

0.516

0.484

0.399

0.323

0.3

0.523

0.477

0.414

0.4

0.536

0.464

0.5

0.565

0.436

1

2

0.879

0.396

0.376

0.826

0.774

0.346

0.323

0.318

0.732

0.668

0.297

0.268

0.438

0.310

0.643

0.557

0.248

0.202

0.484

0.290

0.565

0.436

0.202

0.148

p1

p2

Proposition 7 With the increase in network externality intensity, earlier entrant, website1, assumes aggressive
investment strategy, increasing investment on service quality. Later entrant, website 2, assumes defensive
investment strategy, decreasing investment on service quality, profits of website 1 and website 2 decrease.
With the increase in network externality intensity, customers pay more attention on market share of website.
Customers’ choice takes forecast of future market share of website as the base. Due to uncertainty and
information asymmetry, this forecast is built on current market share. The larger the current market share of
website is, the larger customers forecast that future market share is. Therefore, customers are inclined to choose
the website with larger market share. Comparing with website 2, market share advantage of website 1 is very
obvious. As a result, network externality intensity increases market share of website 1, and decreases market
share of website 2.
In order to maintain market share advantage, website 1 could assume aggressive investment strategy,
increasing investment on service quality, enlarging the gap between website 1 and website 2. Meanwhile, website
1 could decrease price to capture larger market share. But the increased quality comes at increased cost, and with
the decrease in price, website 1’ profit decreases. With the decrease in market share, website 2 can only assume
defensive investment strategy, decreasing investment on service quality. Even if website2 attempts to lower the
price to expand market share, aggressive investment strategy of website 1 makes market share of website 2
decrease, finally reducing website 2’s profit.
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6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we examine the problem of strategic IT investments in B2B market characterized by declining
IT cost, switching cost and network externality using an analytical model of a sequentially duopoly. The
principal implications of our study can be summarized as follows.
Our results highlight that, with the declining IT cost, if the switching cost is low, earlier entrant should
assume defensive investment strategy. Currently, the switching cost is lower in B2B market. The reason is that,
at the present time, operation patterns of B2B websites, such as www.alibaba.com, www.hc360.com, et al., are
very single and homogeneity, customers could turn to different website easily. Therefore, earlier entrant should
decrease investment on service quality at the early stage of its entry, and make decisions of additional
investment according to actual needs and competitive environment, reducing risks from declining IT cost
through multi-period investment.
Our results also showed that if the switching cost is high, earlier entrant should assume aggressive
investment strategy. This finding is very important for B2B market. Single website can’t control IT progress and
cost, but can improve switching cost by providing value-added services.
Our results highlight that, although switching cost is beneficial to assume aggressive investment strategy for
earlier entrant, earlier entrant could provide higher service quality and capture higher market share when the
switching cost is high. As a result, in the B2B market with lower switching cost, the advantage that earlier
entrant enjoys “winner takes all” doesn’t exist, in accordance with practice.
Our results point that earlier and later entrant’s profit decrease when network externality intensity is stronger.
This finding is concordant with practice. Specifically, B2B website is in the stage of calling two-side customers
just after its entry, including buyers and sellers. Website would face the problem that buyer size and seller size
interact with each other, that is, buyers are unwilling to choose the website because of small seller size, the same
happens in sellers’ choice. So B2B website will relinquish profit, charge lower price and offer higher service
quality in the development initial period. In B2B market with network externality, when later entrant enters the
market, later entrant could heighten customer’s confidence through advertisement and promotion activities,
increasing customer’s expectation with network size, finally strengthening competitive advantage.
There are some limitations. A critical assumption of the model is that we consider only two websites in our
model. A worthwhile extension to our model would be to consider n  n  2 competing websites. Thus, the
competitive intensity, as measured by the number of websites, would be an additional factor that may affect the
equilibrium service quality levels and profits. Furthermore, as technology develops over time, early entrant’s
cost disadvantage becomes more severe. Thus, it would be interesting to further study how the early entrants are
affected by increasing competition over time and they can sustain their profitability despite the switching cost.
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